Abstract Multiagent resource allocation provides mechanisms to allocate bundles of resources to agents, where resources are assumed to be indivisible and nonshareable. A central goal is to maximize social welfare of such allocations, which can be measured in terms of the sum of utilities realized by the agents (utilitarian social welfare), in terms of their minimum (egalitarian social welfare), and in terms of their product (Nash product social welfare). Unfortunately, social welfare optimization is a computationally intractable task in many settings. We survey recent approximability and inapproximability results on social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation, focusing on the two most central representation forms for utility functions of agents, the bundle form and the k-additive form. In addition, we provide some new (in)approximability results on maximizing egalitarian social welfare and social welfare with respect to the Nash product when restricted to certain special cases.
Introduction
Multiagent resource allocation (MARA) is a vibrant research area within the emerging field of computational social choice. In particular, MARA has applications in multiagent systems, a subfield of (distributed) artificial intelligence, and is also closely related to other areas of computer science as well as to economics and social choice theory. MARA models the following situation. We are given a set of agents and a set of resources. The resources are assumed to be indivisible and nonshareable. All agents express their preferences over the (bundles of) resources using utility functions. The task is to find an allocation of resources that is "optimal" in terms of social welfare. Our survey will focus on some common types of social welfare, namely utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash product social welfare, under the assumption that utilities are expressed in the bundle form or in the k-additive form (see the following section for the definitions and Example 1 for real-world situations explaining the differences between these two representation forms).
Informally, the three considered measures of social welfare can be explained as follows. Utilitarian social welfare measures the total (and also the average) utility realized by all agents. For example, the auctioneer in a combinatorial auction aims at maximizing the total revenue of the goods auctioned. By contrast, egalitarian social welfare measures the utility of the agent who is worst off in an allocation. This can be important (and the right measure to use) in certain other real-world situations. For example, Roos and Rothe [52] note that for the task of distributing humanitarian aid items (food, tents, medical aid, etc.) among the survivors of a disaster (say, an earthquake) it is more appropriate to use egalitarian than utilitarian social welfare because what matters most in such a situation is the survival of those who are worst off and not the total utility realized by all survivors: Giving everything to just one person has the same utilitarian social welfare as distributing everything equally among all persons, but only one might survive and thousands might die in the first case, whereas the first case has an egalitarian social welfare of zero and the second case has maximum egalitarian social welfare. Thus, fairness is better captured in terms of egalitarian than utilitarian social welfare. Finally, social welfare by the Nash product, which gives the product of the agents' individual utilities, can be seen as some kind of compromise between utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare. Although, admittedly, the Nash product is a bit less natural and less common than the other two measures, it does have a number of favorable properties. For example, assuming that all agents have positive utilities only, it is monotonic just like utilitarian social welfare. Moreover, it does provide some measure of fairness just like egalitarian social welfare, since distributing the given resources "equally" among the agents maximizes also Nash product social welfare. Further beneficial properties of the Nash product are discussed by Moulin [44] .
Since the problems modeling social welfare optimization in these formal settings are computationally hard in general, it makes sense to consider their approximability. The purpose of this survey is to give an overview of recent results in this regard. Moreover, we will present some novel results that complement the existing (in)approximability results on social welfare optimization from the literature. Most of these new results concern social welfare optimization by the Nash product, whose approximability has rarely been considered before (to the best of our knowledge, only in [45] [46] [47] ). This paper considerably extends our 8-page survey that was presented at the 12th International Symposium of Artif icial Intelligence and Mathematics [48] .
Organization of the paper This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how to formalize MARA situations, how to represent the agents' utility functions, what the most important notions of social welfare are, and how the associated optimization problems are defined. Some background of approximation theory that is needed for our survey will be given at the end of this section. Sections 3 and 4 give a short overview of known approximability and inapproximability results for both the bundle and the k-additive form. Section 5 presents some related novel results for certain special cases (some of which are stated without proof in [47] ). Finally, we conclude in Section 6 by raising some open problems for future research.
Basic notions

MARA settings
Our framework is adopted from the work of Chevaleyre et al. [12] . Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } be a set of n agents and let R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be a set of m resources. We assume that the resources are indivisible and nonshareable. Every agent a i has a utility function, u i , expressing a i 's utilities for all bundles of resources. Formally, each utility function u i is a mapping from 2 R to the numerical set F, where F typically is one of R, Q, Q + , Z, N, or simply {0, 1}, and where 2 R is the set of all subsets of R. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } denote the set of all utility functions of the agents. We call such a triple ( A, R, U) a MARA setting. The utility agent a i can realize depends on which resources he or she receives in an allocation of resources. An allocation for a MARA setting ( A, R, U) is a mapping X : A → 2 R such that X (a i ) ∩ X (a j ) = ∅ for i = j and ai∈A X (a i ) = R. We abbreviate the utility u i (X (a i )) agent a i can realize for allocation X by u i (X). Let A,R denote the set of all allocations for ( A, R, U); note that A,R = n m .
Representation of utility functions
An important issue in a MARA model is the representation of utility functions, as choosing this representation may affect the computational complexity of finding an optimal allocation. At least for human agents, the most natural way to represent utility functions is to enumerate all the bundles of resources and attach a utility to these bundles. By convention, we skip bundles with a utility of zero. This way of representing utilities is called the bundle form or the bundle enumeration. Although this form is fully expressive, the size of its representation can be exponential in number of resources (for instance, if an agent has nonzero utilities for all possible bundles). Another form of representing a utility function is the k-additive form, which can be more succinct than the bundle form when k is small. However, the k-additive form is fully expressive only if k is large enough. These forms are formally defined as follows.
-The bundle form: Every utility function u i is represented as the set of pairs (R , u i (R )), where u i (R ) ∈ F for each bundle R ⊆ R of resources with u i (R ) = 0. -The k-additive form, for a fixed positive integer k: Every utility function u i is represented by unique coefficients α T i ∈ F for each bundle T ⊆ R with T ≤ k such that for each bundle S ⊆ R, we have
Intuitively, the coefficients α T i express the "synergetic" value of agent a i owning all resources from bundle T that contains at most k items.
Both the bundle and the k-additive form (for large enough k) can be used to represent any utility function and thus are equivalent in this sense. However, while the bundle form is a direct representation that enumerates the agents' nonzero utilities of bundles, the k-additive form can be seen as an indirect representation using the so-called Möbius inversion (see the work of Rota [53] and Grabisch [28] ). Indeed, letting u i be a set function over the set R of resources, the coefficients α S i for S ⊆ R can be computed as follows:
These two representations can be applied to any set function. The major difference between them is that the bundle form is just one fixed way of specifying utility functions, whereas the parameter k in the k-additive form allows one to fine-tune the trade-off between expressiveness (for large values of k) and compactness (for small values of k). The following real-world example, which is taken from the book by Rothe et al. [55] (available in German only), illustrates the difference between these two representation forms. }, where the superscripts and r, respectively, are used for a left and a right shoe, and shoes with the same subscript are matching pairs. It is natural to assume that a matching shoe pair is of higher value to an agent than a single shoe. That is why agent a 1 has the following utility function: (a) u 1 (∅) = 0; (b) if B with ∅ = B ⊂ R is a nonempty bundle containing x matching pairs of shoes and y single shoes (but not all ten pairs of shoes), then u 1 (B) = 10 · x + y; and (c) u 1 (R) = 80 (i.e., for all ten pairs of shoes, agent a 1 expects some discount and is not willing to pay the 100 dollars that would result from the formula in (b) in this case). For example, we have
Of course, since the bundle form (which corresponds to the XOR bidding language, see, e.g., [12] ) is fully expressive, u 1 can be represented that way. But to actually represent u 1 in the bundle form, we would have to list all 2 20 − 1 = 1,048,575 pairs (B, u 1 (B)) with B = ∅.
By contrast, in the 2-additive form, it is enough to determine the constants α T 1 for all bundles T ⊆ R with T ≤ 2:
For example, we again obtain for the bundle B = {s 1 
However, for the bundle R with all pairs of shoes, we obtain:
Only if k = 20, we would be able to fully represent u 1 in k-additive form. Thus, we have to evaluate the pros and cons of the disadvantage that u 2-additive 1 differs from u 1 for one bundle against the advantage that it is enough to give only There are other ways of representing utilities as well. For example, utility functions can be represented via straight line programs, which are based on boolean circuits, but since we do not consider them in this paper, we will not define them formally and we refer to [12, 19] instead.
Properties of utility functions
In the context of combinatorial auctions or multiagent resource allocation, we usually require that the utility functions satisfy some special properties such as monotonicity, submodularity, fractional subadditivity, and subadditivity. Formally, these notions are defined as follows. Let u : 2 R → R be a set function (e.g., a utility function).
-u is monotonic if u(S) ≤ u(T) for all S and T with S ⊆ T ⊆ R.
-u is submodular if for any two (not necessarily disjoint) subsets S, T ⊆ R,
-u is fractionally subadditive if
-u is subadditive (or complement-free) if for any two subsets S, T ⊆ R,
It follows immediately from the definitions above that every fractionally subadditive function is monotonic and nonnegative, every subadditive function is nonnegative, whereas submodular functions need neither be monotonic nor nonnegative in general. More specifically, among nonnegative, monotonic set functions the following strict inclusions can be shown between these three classes of functions: {u | u is submodular} ⊂ {u | u is fractionally subadditive} ⊂ {u | u is subadditive}.
We take an example due to Feige [21] to illustrate the above relationships. Consider the set function u over the set of subsets of R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } with u(∅) = 0, and u(S) = 1 if S contains one or two items from R. We also assume that u is nonnegative. If
In order to make u fractionally subadditive, we can set u(R) to any value less than or equal to 3/2, and this satisfies
. Finally, it is easy to see that u will be submodular if u(R) = 1.
Note that the notion of submodular function can be defined in another way as well. A set function u is submodular if for all S and T with S ⊆ T ⊆ R and for all r ∈ R − T,
where u(B ∪ {r}) − u(B) denotes the marginal value of resource r with respect to bundle B. This second definition shows the property of non-increasing marginal values of a submodular function. Hence, they can be seen as discrete analogs of concave functions (similarly to convex functions in optimization theory), and they have structural characteristics that can be taken advantage of algorithmically. In other words, submodularity of functions can help to make the related optimization problems approximable or even tractable. Therefore, the class of submodular functions has been extensively studied in many mathematical models for many years. Their applications occur naturally in various areas of computer science, economics, and applied mathematics, such as game theory, operations research, machine learning, and computer vision. Below we give some examples that partially explain why submodular set functions arise naturally in many mathematical models: -Set cover: Let B be a finite set and let {S 1 , . . . , S n } be a collection of subsets of B.
The coverage function f , defined by f (I) = i∈I S i for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, is submodular.
-Rank of a matrix: Let A be a matrix and let R be the set of rows of A. For each subset S ⊆ R, let r(S) denote the rank of the matrix formed by the rows in S. Then r is submodular. -Cut functions in graphs: Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph and let w : E → R + be a capacity function on its edges. For every subset S ⊆ V, denote by S * the set of edges in the graph that have exactly one vertex in S. One can show that the cut function c :
For more examples of using submodular functions, we refer to the work of Lovász [43] .
Social welfare
In social choice theory and economics, the notion of social welfare measures the quality of an allocation in some sense. The survey by [12] reviews some types of social welfare in detail. In this paper, however, we focus on the three most basic types of social welfare only: utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash product social welfare. While utilitarian and Nash product social welfare are the sum and the product, respectively, of the agents' individual utilities, egalitarian social welfare equals the smallest utility among the agents in a given allocation, i.e., the utility of an agent who is worst off. These notions of social welfare are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Social welfare) For a MARA setting ( A, R, U) and an allocation X, define 1. the utilitarian social welfare of X as
2. the egalitarian social welfare of X as
3. the Nash product social welfare of X as
As an additional notation, for S ∈ {u, e, N}, denote the maximum utilitarian/egalitarian/Nash product social welfare of a MARA setting M = ( A, R, U) by
Three maximization problems can be defined for these types of social welfare. For example, the maximization problem for utilitarian social welfare is formally defined as:
As a shorthand, write F-Max-USW form , where F, as mentioned earlier, typically is one of R, Q, Q + , Z, N, or simply {0, 1}. Using sw e and sw N instead of sw u , we obtain F-Maximum Egalitarian Social Welfare form (or F-Max-ESW form ) and F-Maximum Nash Product Social Welfare form (or F-Max-NPSW form ) accordingly.
For the related decision problems (where we ask whether for a given MARA setting there exists an allocation whose utilitarian, egalitarian, or Nash product social welfare is equal to or exceeds some given bound B), NP-hardness is known; see, in particular, the survey by Chevaleyre et al. [12] , the work of Chevaleyre et al. [14] , the extension of their work by Roos and Rothe [52] , and the other references cited in Table 1 , which summarizes these results. Hence, the corresponding optimization Utilitarian NP-c (see [14] ) NP-c, k ≥ 2 (see [14] ) Egalitarian NP-c (see [52] ) NP-c, k ≥ 1 (see [52] , implicitly in [42] ) Nash product NP-c (see [52] , independently [51] ) NP-c, k ≥ 1 (see [52] )
Key: NP-c means "NP-complete"
problems are NP-hard in the sense that they cannot be solved in polynomial time, unless P = NP. Thus our goal is to study the (in)approximability of these problems.
We give an overview of several known results and also provide some related new results for special instances of these problems.
Basic notions of approximation theory
We assume the reader is familiar with complexity-theoretic notions such as reducibility, NP-completeness, etc. (see, e.g., the textbooks by Garey and Johnson [24] , Papadimitriou [50] , and Rothe [54] ). We now provide some formal definitions related to approximation algorithms and describe some basic techniques as the tools to prove inapproximability of optimization problems. We start with the definition of approximation algorithm.
Definition 2 (α-approximation algorithm) Let P be a maximization problem and α < 1. An α-approximation algorithm A for P is a polynomial-time algorithm that for every instance x of P produces a solution A(x) whose value is at least α · OPT(x), where OPT(x) denotes the optimal value for x.
We call α the approximation factor (or sometimes the approximation ratio or performance guarantee) of an α-approximation algorithm. Note that α may depend on the size of the given instance.
Definition 3 (PTAS) A maximization problem P has a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) if for each
ε, 0 < ε < 1, there exists a (1 − ε)-approximation algorithm A ε for P.
Definition 4 (FPTAS)
A PTAS is said to be a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) if the running time of A ε is polynomial in both the input size and 1/ε. We now discuss some important techniques used to prove the inapproximability results in this paper. An easy way to prove that some optimization problem P is hard to approximate is to use a reduction from an NP-complete problem in order to design a gap-introducing reduction. We apply this technique to maximization problems only. In the following, OPT will always denote the function mapping an instance x to the value of an optimal solution with respect to the maximization problem at hand. 
Definition 5 (α-gap-introducing reduction) Let
Note that an α-approximation algorithm for a maximization problem P that has an α-gap-introducing reduction from an NP-complete problem A would allow us to distinguish between the yes-and no-instances of A in polynomial time. Hence, having such a reduction implies that there can be no α-approximation algorithm for P, unless P = NP.
Definition 6 (L-reduction) Let P 1 and P 2 be some maximization problems. An Lreduction from P 1 to P 2 is given by two polynomial-time computable functions f and g and two parameters α and β such that for each instance x of P 1 , y = f (x) is an instance of P 2 and it holds that: 
The key point to note here is that when we have an L-reduction from P 1 to P 2 with parameters α and β and we have a (1 − ε)-approximation algorithm for P 2 , where ε > 0 is a constant, then we obtain a (1 − δ)-approximation algorithm for P 1 with δ = α · β · ε. In particular, if P 1 L-reduces to P 2 with parameters α = β = 1 and we know that P 1 cannot have an (1 − ε)-approximation algorithm (unless, say, P = NP), then P 2 cannot have a (1 − ε)-approximation algorithm either, unless P = NP.
For more background on approximation theory, see, e.g., the textbook by Vazirani [56] and the survey by Arora and Lund [1] .
Approximability of social welfare optimization for utilities in the bundle form
After the overview of some basic notions of approximation theory given in the previous section, in this section we study the (in)approximability of maximizing social welfare under the bundle form. Regarding utilitarian social welfare, this problem has been studied as Generalized Vickrey Auctioning (GVA for short) in the field of combinatorial auctions. In this context, Lehmann et al. [40] showed that GVA cannot be approximated within m ε−1/2 unless NP = ZPP, where ZPP has been introduced by Gill [25] as the class of decision problems that have a probabilistic algorithm that, on every input, runs in expected polynomial time and never returns a wrong answer. The result of Lehmann et al. [40] holds even for so-called single-minded agents and is proven via a reduction from the well-known problem Clique whose optimization version is known to be hard to approximate [29] . Formally, an agent a i is said to be single-minded if there is a bundle R i ⊆ R and a value v ∈ R + such that u i (T) = u i (R i ) = v for any bundle T with R i ⊆ T ⊆ R, and u i (T) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, a combinatorial auction with n single-minded agents and the set R of resources can be expressed by a sequence (R, (R 1 , u 1 ) , . . . , (R n , u n )), where u i is the value of the "core bundle" R i to agent a i . Table 2 summarizes this and other results mentioned in this section and some more.
Since utility functions represented in the bundle form can be exponential in the number m of resources, we need to specify how an algorithm can access its input. One way to do this is to use a fixed natural "bidding language" (if one exists). (For notions not defined in this survey, we refer to the paper by Nisan [49] .) Another approach uses different types of oracle to be queried. A value oracle returns the utility of a given bundle of resources for a given agent-this model is typical from the point of Table 2 Summary of (in)approximability of social welfare optimization problems for the bundle form Problem (restriction) Approximability Reference
[6] Not approximable in polynomial time [14] , see [52] 
NP-hard in any factor Proposition 1 (even with u i (r) ∈ {0, 1}) Max-NPSW bundle NP-hard in any factor (even with u i (r) ∈ {0, 1}) Key: DO means "demand oracle" and VO means "value oracle" The asterisk indicates that the result is obtained by a randomized algorithm; all other results are achieved via deterministic algorithms view of computer science. A stronger model is typical from an economics perspective:
In the demand oracle model, a query is a vector (v 1 , . . . , v m ) of particular utilities corresponding to the m resources (r 1 , . . . , r m ), and for agent a i the demand oracle returns a bundle T ⊆ R such that the value u i (T) − r j ∈T v j is maximal. Informally put, for every agent a i the demand oracle will provide a bundle T most demanded by this agent given these prices on m resources. It is known that a value oracle can be simulated using demand queries [6] . Some results in Table 2 are given in either the demand or the value oracle model, some in the general case.
As shown previously in Table 1 , the problem of maximizing social welfare is NPhard in general, for each of utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash product social welfare. Even if the utility functions are presented in a succinct way, the problem is still NPhard to approximate (see Proposition 1). In the last few years, many attempts have been made to find special cases in which the problem can be approximated efficiently, e.g., by using restricted classes of utility functions such as submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive functions. This paper surveys some important results obtained in this area corresponding to these classes of functions.
The problem Max-USW bundle was first studied by Lehmann et al. [39] in the value oracle model for submodular utilities. They designed a greedy algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of 1/2 for this problem. The key idea of the algorithm is that every resource will be assigned to the agent with maximal marginal value in the current allocation. Fleischer et al. [23] , Calinescu et al. [8] , and Vondrák [57] improved their result to a (1 − 1/e)-approximation, where e ≈ 2,71828182 is Euler's number. While the approach of Fleischer et al. [23] and Calinescu et al. [8] applies linear programming, Vondrák [57] designed a randomized approximation algorithm (see Algorithm 1) . Recall that n is the number of agents and m is the number of resources. Note that the choice of δ and σ in this algorithm is not fixed. With fewer samples (i.e., by choosing a smaller σ ) or a larger iteration width δ, one can speed up the runtime of the algorithm achieving essentially the same approximation ratio. Ties in line 16 can be broken arbitrarily.
More precisely, Vondrák [57] shows that his randomized Algorithm 1 achieves in expectation a (1 − 1/e − o(1))-approximation for Max-USW bundle with submodular utilities in the value oracle model. The runtime of the algorithm depends on the values of the variables δ and σ in lines 2 and 3, respectively, and is in O(m 2 · n · σ/δ). The key step of the algorithm is done in line 12: Since ω ij is the estimated profit agent a i can realize from owning resource r j , the value y ij is increased by δ for agent a i , whose maximum estimated profit is ω ij for this resource. In the next iteration, the probability that resource r j is in R i increases, where R i denotes the subset of resources that should be assigned to agent a i according to the probabilities computed so far. Resource r j is not necessarily given to the agent for whom y ij is maximal. The y ij give a probability distribution according to which the resources are distributed. Hence, it is most likely that the agent with the maximal y ij gets the resource, but it is also possible that another agent receives it.
Khot et al. [36] prove that this bound of 1 − 1/e is tight: It is NP-hard to approximate Max-USW bundle with a factor better than 1 − 1/e in the submodular setting and the value oracle model. Dobzinski and Schapira [18] provide an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e for submodular utilities in the demand oracle model. Their algorithm is based on solving an LP relaxation of the problem and using the technique of randomized rounding. Feige and Vondrák [22] improved this algorithm by designing end for 8: end for 9: for t = 0, . . . , 1; step t := t + δ do 10: for i = 1, . . . , n do 11: for j = 1, . . . , m do 12: Take σ independent random samples R i ⊆ R so that resource r j is contained in R i with probability y ij . Take the average to estimate the expected marginal profit of agent a i from resource r j :
13:
end for 14: end for 15: for j = 1, . . . , m do 16: Choose a most preferred agent a i j := arg max i ω ij for resource r j .
17:
end for 18: for i = 1, . . . , n do 19: for j = 1, . . . , m do 20: if a i = a i j then 21: Update y ij := y ij + δ. 22: end if 23: end for 24: end for 25 : end for 26: Allocate each resource r j independently to agent a i so as to maximize the probability y ij .
a (1 − 1/e + ε)-approximation (in expectation) for some constant ε > 0 (in fact, ε ≈ 10 −2 ). The best known lower bound of 15/16 for this problem in demand oracle model was established by Chakrabarty and Goel [10] .
For the class of fractionally subadditive functions, using the demand oracle, Feige [21] gave a randomized (1 − 1/e)-approximation for the problem Max-USW bundle based on "oblivious rounding techniques," while Dobzinski et al. [17] designed a deterministic approximation algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of 1/2. In particular, Feige [21] showed that this class of utility functions is the same as the XOS class, 1 that is, a utility function is fractionally subadditive if and only if it is in the class XOS. A (1 − 1/e)-approximation was also obtained for the XOS class by Dobzinski and Schapira [18] , who proved that this upper bound is tight. In addition, they provided a lower bound result with approximation factor 1/m 1/4 for the case of using a value oracle only. Dobzinski et al. [17] presented a 1/log m-approximation in the demand oracle model and another 1/ √ m-approximation algorithm in the value oracle model for Max-USW bundle with subadditive utilities. One year later, Feige [21] improved this result by providing an approximation factor of 1/2 in the demand oracle model, and he also proved that it is impossible to have an approximation algorithm with a factor better than 1/2 in the value oracle model. Recently, the problem Max-ESW bundle was studied by some authors but only for the model of value oracle. For submodular utilities, Golovin [27] gave a first greedy approximation algorithm for this problem with a factor of 1/(m − n + 1) based on a matching technique. This approximation factor was then improved to 1/ m 1/2 n 1/4 log m log 3/2 n by Goemans et al. [26] . The idea is to transform the original problem to the "Santa Claus" max-min allocation problem (see Footnote 3 in Section 4), which has been shown to be approximable by Asadpour and Saberi [2, 3] (see Table 3 in Section 4). If the number of agents is fixed, Chekuri et al. [11] gave an approximation algorithm for Max-ESW bundle with a better factor of 1 − 1/e − ε for any ε > 0. When the utility functions are subadditive, Khot and Ponnuswami [37] proposed a 1/(2n − 1)-approximation algorithm, and this is the best known result so far for Max-ESW bundle .
Recommendable literature about the problem of maximizing social welfare in the context of combinatorial auctions is the bookchapter by Blumrosen and Nisan [7] . This chapter provides some basic knowledge from this area as well as several important recent results. As mentioned above, typically utilitarian social welfare is studied in this context. Later on, we will give some inapproximability results for maximizing egalitarian and Nash product social welfare when utilities are represented in the bundle form (see Proposition 1 in Section 5). But first let us turn to approximating social welfare optimization for the k-additive form.
Approximability of social welfare optimization for k-additive utilities
Chevaleyre et al. [14] showed that the problem Q-Max-USW 1-additive can be solved exactly in polynomial time. Indeed, it is easy to design a greedy algorithm for this problem according to the following rule: Every resource will be assigned to an agent who has maximum utility for it. Obviously, this algorithm runs in time O(n · m) and returns the maximum utilitarian social welfare. For k = 2, one immediately obtains an inapproximability result for Q-Max-USW k-additive from the work of Chevaleyre et al. [14] (which will be improved in Proposition 2 in Section 5). They proved NP-completeness of the decision version of Q-Max-USW 2-additive by a reduction from the decision version of Maximum 2-Satisfiability (Max-2-Sat, for short). This optimization problem is defined as follows.
Maximum 2-Satisfiability
Input:
A boolean formula ϕ in conjunctive normal form consisting of clauses having two literals each. Output: A truth assignment to the variables of ϕ that maximizes the number of satisfied clauses.
The best (unconditional 2 ) inapproximability result currently known for Max-2-Sat is due to Håstad [30] , who shows that this problem is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 21/22 ≈ 0.9545. Using this result, we obtain the corresponding inapproximability bound for Q + -Max-NPSW 2-additive (see Proposition 3 in Section 5). The problem Q-Max-ESW 1-additive is known as the "Santa Claus" problem 3 in the field of combinatorial auctions. Recall from Table 1 that the decision version of Q-Max-ESW 1-additive is NP-complete [52] . An inapproximability result for Q-Max-ESW 1-additive is due to Bezáková and Dani [5] : Q-Max-ESW 1-additive cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of α > 1/2, unless P = NP. This is also the best inapproximability result known for Q-Max-ESW 1-additive . In the same paper, using techniques based on matching as well as rounding techniques for linear programming relaxation, Bezáková and Dani [5] design two approximation algorithms for Q + -Max-ESW 1-additive , both having a performance guarantee of 1/(m − n + 1). Building on the work of Lenstra et al. [41] , Bezáková and Dani [5] proved that one can obtain a solution of value at least OPT − max ij u i (r j ), where OPT denotes the value of the optimal solution. However, the challenging case of the problem is when the condition OPT ≤ max ij u i (r j ) holds.
Golovin [27] studies a restricted version of Q + -Max-ESW 1-additive , which is also known as "Big Goods/Small Goods." In this restricted problem, the agents are allowed to choose among three values only (0, 1, and some x > 1) to express their utilities. For the small goods, each agent is allowed to assign utilities of zero and one, and for the big goods the allowed values are zero and x > 1. Using min-cut and network flow techniques, Golovin [27] shows that this problem is approximable in polynomial time within a factor of 1/ √ n, where n is the number of agents. Khot and Ponnuswami [37] generalize this model of Big Goods/Small Goods, considering the less restricted version in which the agents' utilities for a resource are either 0, 1, or x for some x > 1. For this case, they give an α/n-approximation algorithm that runs in time m O(1) n O(α) . Note that there is a trade-off between the running time and the guarantee factor.
Golovin [27] also studies another special variant of Q + -Max-ESW 1-additive , namely when there are as many agents as resources (i.e., m = n) and the empty bundle has zero utility, which is a reasonable assumption. It is then easy to see that each agent must get at least one resource to obtain an egalitarian social welfare distinct from zero. Hence, this problem can be solved in polynomial time [27] , and the same applies to k-additive utilities for any k ≥ 1. Analogous results are shown in Theorem 2 for the problem Q + -Max-NPSW k-additive subject to the same restriction. Bansal and Sviridenko [4] investigate another restriction of the Santa Claus problem: If only two values are allowed for each single resource (i.e., r j has either some value x j or zero for each of the agents), then there is an O(log log log n/log log n)-approximation. Their method is based on rounding a certain type of linear programming relaxation that is also known as conf iguration linear program. Later on, Feige [20] showed that the value obtained by this LP relaxation estimates the optimum value to within a constant factor. However, his algorithm is not constructive, that is, it does not allow to actually find the corresponding allocation in polynomial time.
In the general case, Asadpour and Saberi [2, 3] proposed an improved approximation algorithm that achieves a factor of (1/ √ n log 3 n) for Q + -Max-ESW 1-additive , using the same linear program relaxation that Bansal and Sviridenko [4] employed. For the general problem, the best known approximability result so far is given by Chakrabarty et al. [9] : They presented an O(1/m ε )-approximation for any ε ∈ (log log m/log m) that runs in time m O(1/ε) . Note that this result can also be 
The approximation results shown here assume that the empty bundle has always a value of zero for all agents used to obtain an approximation in terms of the number of agents. Asadpour et al. [3] proposed a method based on local search that outputs the solution of the configuration linear program which has a value of at least (1/5)OPT. Unfortunately, it takes exponential time in n to find this (1/5)-approximate solution.
Building and improving on the work of Deuermeyer et al. [16] and Csirik et al. [15] , Woeginger [58] studies the problem of maximizing the minimum completion time of jobs to be scheduled on parallel identical machines (which in some sense is dual to the problem of minimizing the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time), and he designed a PTAS for it. Since this problem is NP-complete in the strong sense [24] , there can be no FPTAS for it, unless P = NP. For Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive , restricted to two agents having the same utility functions and such that the empty bundle has zero utility, we design a PTAS in Theorem 3. Note also that this problem is closely related to the problem Minimum Partition (to be described right after the proof of Theorem 3), which is a special variant of the optimization version of Subset of Sums and has even an FPTAS [34] . Table 3 summarizes the results mentioned in this section.
Proving some special results
In this section we present some new results for certain special cases referred to in the two previous sections, and their proofs. Recall from Table 2 that, as noted by Roos and Rothe [52] , it follows from a result of Chevaleyre et al. [14] that Max-USW bundle cannot be approximated within a factor of n ε−1 , unless NP = ZPP. Can similar inapproximability results for Q-Max-ESW bundle and Q + -Max-NPSW bundle be obtained? While this question still remains open, a gap-introducing reduction mentioned already in [52] and attributed to an anonymous reviewer of their paper provides a different kind of inapproximability result for these two problems. This gap-introducing reduction, which is presented in the proof of the following proposition, is from the NP-complete problem Exact Set Cover (XSC, for short), which is defined as follows (see, e.g., the textbook by Garey and Johnson [24] ):
Exact Set Cover
Given:
A . . , a n } be our set of agents, and let R = B be our set of m resources. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the utility function of agent a i is defined as
If (B, S ) is a yes-instance of XSC then there exists some set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that {S i | i ∈ I} is a partition of B, i.e., i∈I S i = B and S i ∩ S j = ∅ for all distinct i, j ∈ I. Hence, by assigning the bundle S i to agent a i for each i ∈ I and the empty bundle to all remaining agents, we have max e (M) = max N (M) = 1.
Conversely, suppose (B, S ) is a no-instance of XSC. As all resources need to be allocated, the optimal social welfare value (in both measures) is zero:
If one could approximate either of these two problems within any factor in polynomial time, one could thus decide XSC in polynomial time, contradicting NPhardness of XSC unless P = NP.
Turning now to k-additive utilities, we start with an inapproximability result for maximizing utilitarian social welfare. This result is based on a reduction given by Chevaleyre et al. [14] (and attributed to Lang in their paper) from the decision version of the problem Max-2-SAT, which was defined in the previous section. 4 While their reduction is used to show NP-hardness of the corresponding decision problem, we apply it to show inapproximability of Q-Max-USW k-additive .
Proposition 2
For each k ≥ 2, Q-Max-USW k-additive cannot be approximated in polynomial time within any factor better than α = 21/22, unless P = NP. This result holds even when there are only two agents.
Proof The reduction Chevaleyre et al. [14] used to show NP-hardness of the decision problem corresponding to Q-Max-USW 2-additive from the decision version of Max-2-Sat immediately yields an L-reduction from Max-2-Sat to Q-Max-USW 2-additive . Let ϕ be an instance of Max-2-Sat.
The Q-Max-USW 2-additive instance M = ( A, R, U) constructed from ϕ has two agents (i.e., A = {a 1 , a 2 }), each resource in R corresponds to a propositional variable occurring in ϕ, and the agents' utilities are set in 2-additive form. The utility function of agent a 1 is defined by Chevaleyre et al. [14] as the sum of the following 2-additive terms each of which corresponds to a clause of ϕ:
if the clause has the form x i ∨ ¬x j , i = j, and
Agent a 2 's coefficients are defined as α T 2 = 0 for all bundles T ⊆ R, T ≤ 2.
4 Note that Chevaleyre et al. [13] provide a similar reduction using the Maximum Independent Set problem. They also point out a relation to approximation algorithms and suggest to exploit highly optimized approximation algorithms to find optimal (or nearly optimal) allocations of resources.
Note that every assignment τ of truth values to the propositional variables of ϕ corresponds to a resource allocation X τ for M, since agent a 1 receives resource x i exactly if x i is set to true under τ . It follows that sw u (X τ ) equals the number of clauses in ϕ satisfied by τ . Thus max u (M) equals the maximum number of satisfiable clauses in ϕ.
Since this is an L-reduction from Max-2-Sat to Q-Max-USW 2-additive , the inapproximability bound of 21/22 for Max-2-Sat due to Håstad [30] immediately transfers to Q-Max-USW 2-additive .
The same inapproximability result for the k-additive cases with k > 2 follows immediately from the 2-additive case.
Next, we consider egalitarian social welfare. The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, but uses a reduction from the strongly NP-complete problem Exact Cover by 3-Sets (or X3C, for short), which is defined as follows (see, e.g., [24] Proof Since by a reduction due to Chevaleyre et al. [13] 3-additive utilities can always be transformed into 2-additive utilities, it suffices to prove the result for the case of k = 3. Let (B, S ) be an instance of X3C, where B = 3n and S = {S 1 , . . . , S m }. Construct an instance M = ( A, R, U) of Q-Max-ESW 3-additive as follows. The set of n agents is A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } and the set of resources is R = B. For each agent a i ∈ A, define the coefficients in the 3-additive representation of a i 's utility function as follows:
Suppose that (B, S ) is a yes-instance of X3C. Then there exist n pairwise disjoint subsets S 1 , . . . , S n of S such that 1≤i≤n S i = B. Hence, assigning the bundle S i to agent a i for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have max e (M) = 1.
Conversely, we show that if (B, S ) is a no-instance of X3C, then there is at least one agent who owns a bundle T ⊆ B such that T does not contain any subset S i ∈ S . This implies that sw e (X) = 0 for each allocation X, so max e (M) = 0. Indeed, assume that all agents are assigned bundles containing some S j ∈ S . Since the resources are indivisible and nonshareable, there must be n pairwise disjoint subsets in S that are an exact cover of B, a contradiction.
Therefore, if there were a polynomial-time approximation algorithm that approximates Q-Max-ESW 3-additive within any factor, then it could distinguish yes-from no-instances of X3C. This contradicts the NP-hardness of X3C unless P = NP, and the theorem follows.
Finally, turning to Nash product social welfare, we now present an exact polynomial-time algorithm for Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive when restricted to m = n and assuming that the empty bundle has always utility zero, by converting this problem to the problem of finding a maximum matching in some complete bipartite graph. We then extend this result to the general case of the k-additive form for any k. As mentioned in the previous section, an analogous result has also been established by Golovin [27] for Q-Max-ESW 1-additive with the same restriction and can also be applied to the k-additive form when k ≥ 2. The edges {a i , r j } ∈ E are weighted by some function w :
where μ = max{u i (r j ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n and r j ∈ R}. Note that a perfect matching with maximal weight on the complete bipartite graph G = (V, E) can be found in polynomial time, for example by the "Hungarian method" due to Kuhn [38] . Now we prove that a maximum matching of the complete bipartite graph G corresponds to an allocation maximizing social welfare of M by the Nash-Product. Indeed, it is easy to see that each of the agents can get only one single resource. 5 Since the number of vertices of G is 2n, there are n! possible matchings and each of them has the form: r π(1) ), (a 2 , r π(2) ), . . . , (a n , r π(n) )} where π is a permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Define the weight of M π by
and let M max be a matching of maximum weight. Since u i (r j ) ≤ μ for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and all r j ∈ R, the weight of a matching is positive if and only if it does not contain any edge of negative weight. Thus, if W(M max ) < 0 then the maximum Nash product of ( A, R, U) is zero. We may thus suppose that M max has no edge whose weight is negative, i.e., u i (r π(i) ) ≥ 1 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where π is the permutation corresponding to M max . Suppose there were another allocation (corresponding to a matching M π ) with a larger Nash product than the allocation corresponding to
This, however, would imply
and hence we have
a contradiction to the fact that M max is a matching of maximum weight in G. Thus, M max corresponds to an allocation maximizing social welfare of ( A, R, U) by the Nash product.
The above argument can be easily extended to the case of k ≥ 2, since each of the agents will get only one single resource, as otherwise the Nash product social welfare would be zero (see Footnote 5) . Now consider the other special case of the problem Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive mentioned in the previous section and suppose that there are only two agents having the same utility function. The problem thus restricted is still NP-hard, which follows from the construction given by Roos and Rothe [52] . We are interested in the approximability of the problem with this restriction. In particular, we will design an PTAS for Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive under this restriction. Proof Let M = ( A, R, U) be a given MARA setting with two agents (i.e., A = {a 1 , a 2 }) and nonnegative utilities u 1 (r) = u 2 (r) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R. Let u denote this utility function, i.e., u = u 1 = u 2 . Consider the following greedy algorithm for this problem. Intuitively, this algorithm seeks to find disjoint subsets R and R of R such that R ∪ R = R and the product u(R ) · u(R ) is maximized, where u(T) = r∈T u(r). Without loss of generality, we can assume that R is assigned to agent a 1 and R is assigned to agent a 2 . Let ε be any fixed constant such that 0 < ε < 1. 
end if 10: end for 11: return (R , R )
We now prove that Algorithm 2 is a (1 − ε)-approximation algorithm for Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive in our restricted setting. We need to show that the algorithm always returns in polynomial time two subsets R and R such that u(R ) · u(R ) ≥ (1 − ε)OPT, where OPT is the optimal value of the problem, max N (M).
Without loss of generality, we assume that u(R ) ≥ u(R ) and that r j is the last resource that was assigned to agent a 1 . This implies that u(R ) ≥ u(R ) − u(r j ). By addition of u(R ) to the two sides of the inequality we get
If j ≤ k, it is easy to see that the obtained solution is indeed an optimal solution. Otherwise, we have u(r j ) ≤ u(r i ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, since the sequence (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m ) was sorted in nonincreasing order according to their utilities. Therefore, one can easily check that u(R) ≥ (k + 1)u(r j ). Furthermore, it is obvious that OPT ≤ (u(R)) 2 /4 and, due to the well-known inequality a As mentioned in the previous section, Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive is closely related to the problem:
Minimum Partition
Input:
A sequence (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) of n nonnegative integers.
Output:
A subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} of indices that minimizes max i∈I c i , i ∈I c i .
Note that max i∈I c i , i ∈I c i is minimal exactly when the two sums are equal. Similarly, assigning a bundle of equal value to both agents maximizes social welfare by the Nash product. As mentioned in the previous section, the problem Minimum Makespan Scheduling (see [56] for the definition) is also closely related to Q-Max-ESW 1-additive . Since Minimum Makespan Scheduling is strongly NP-complete, it is impossible to have an FPTAS for this problem, assuming P = NP. However, there does exist a PTAS [31] . This problem even has an FPTAS when the number of machines is fixed [33] ). Despite the similarities between the four problems mentioned above, since they have different objective functions, it is not clear whether approximability results for one problem transfer to one of the other three. In particular, we conjecture that when the number of agents is fixed, Q + -Max-NPSW 1-additive has an FPTAS as well.
Finally, we have the following inapproximability results for Q + -Max-NPSW k-additive for every fixed k ≥ 2. We start with the case of k = 2. Note that the transformation from the k-additive form (k ≥ 3) to the 2-additive form cannot be used to give a hardness result for Q + -Max-NPSW 2-additive as in the case of QMax-ESW 2-additive . The reason is that this transformation will require to create some dummy resources whose values might be negative and this would contradict the definition of Q + -Max-NPSW k-additive .
Proposition 3 Q
+ -Max-NPSW 2-additive cannot be approximated in polynomial time within any factor better than α = 21/22, unless P = NP. This result holds even when there are only two agents.
Proof Modify the reduction from the proof of Proposition 2: For agent a 2 , the empty bundle has utility one and all other bundles with at most two resources have utility zero. Thus the number of clauses satisfied is exactly the maximum Nash product social welfare. Everything else remains unchanged. Using the inapproximability bound of α = 21/22 for Max-2-Sat due to Håstad [30] , the result follows.
For the case of k ≥ 3, an even stronger inapproximability result can be shown: Q + -Max-NPSW k-additive is NP-hard to approximate to within any factor.
Theorem 4
For each k ≥ 3, Q + -Max-NPSW k-additive cannot be approximated in polynomial time within any factor, unless P = NP.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Let (B, S ) be an instance of X3C. We construct an instance M = ( A, R, U) of Q-Max-NPSW 3-additive in which the sets A, R, U are the same as in the proof of Theorem 1. Assume that (B, S ) is a yesinstance of X3C, that is, there exist n pairwise disjoint subsets S 1 , . . . , S n in S such that 1≤i≤n S i = B. It is easy to see that an optimal allocation is obtained by assigning bundle S i to agent a i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and thus we have max N (M) = 1. Conversely, suppose that (B, S ) is a no-instance of X3C and all agents are assigned bundles containing some S j ∈ S . Since the resources are indivisible and nonshareable, there must be n pairwise disjoint subsets in S that are an exact cover of B, a contradiction. Hence, there is always at least one agent whose bundle does not contain any subset S i ∈ S . That means for any possible allocation X, there is an agent a i such that u i (X) = 0 and thus, sw N (X) = 0 and so max N (M) = 0.
Conclusions and open questions
Social welfare optimization is one of the most important and vibrant research fields in multiagent resource allocation. We have surveyed some known and presented some new approximability and inapproximability results for the problems of maximizing utilitarian, egalitarian, or Nash product social welfare, where the agents' utilities are represented either in the bundle or the k-additive form. These results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 and complement the results known for the corresponding decision problems stated in Table 1 .
Still, many problems remain open, especially for the unrestricted problems considered in this survey. While for the bundle form mainly results on utilitarian social welfare optimization are known (see Table 2 ), most results known for the k-additive form regard egalitarian social welfare optimization (see Table 3 ). We propose to study all three types of social welfare for both representation forms, and have started this endeavor by focusing in particular on the previously somewhat neglected Nash product social welfare in this paper.
